



Supermarket Competition through Price Promotions: 
 A Cross Category Analysis 
 
Richard James Volpe, III
1
                                                   
1 Author is a Ph.D Candidate in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Department, University of 
California, Davis.  
 
 
University of California, Davis 
 
Selected Paper #610193 prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics 













Copyright 2009 by [Richard J Volpe, III]. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of 
this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided this copyright notice appears on 
all such copies. 
 
This is a preliminary working paper and may not be cited without the author’s permission.   Abstract 
This study takes an important first step at quantifying the nature of competition between major 
supermarket chains through price promotions. Using data that covers virtually the entire product 
menus of supermarkets representing two major chains in 18 cities, I examine both the effect of 
direct competition on promotional intensity and the nature of promotional competition itself. In a 
counterintuitive finding, there appears to slightly less promotional activity in cities in which both 
chains compete directly, as compared to cities in which only one chain operates. Moreover, most 
promotional activity tends to be retaliatory, rather than accommodating, in nature.  
   I.  Introduction 
The food retail industry in the United States is changing. Supermarkets are falling in number but 
growing in size in order to offer a wider range of products. Consumer demand is growing for 
vegetarian options, prepared foods, organics, and a wide variety of other specialty and niche 
products. Warehouse superstores such as Wal-Mart Supercenters are springing up all over the 
country, and their market shares are increasing in many regions. The supermarket industry is 
joining much of the rest of US retail in offering internet shopping. There is much that is not 
understood regarding to the directions in which food retail in the U.S. is heading during this 
period of flux. The purpose of this study is to investigate the manner by which two major US 
supermarket chains compete through prices and promotions. Fundamental to my research is the 
understanding that, through advancements in the internet, these two chains are now able to 
monitor each other’s prices and promotions virtually without cost. 
  The strategic toolkit used by supermarkets includes both price promotions and non-price 
advertising and the distinction between the two is of fundamental importance to this study. Price 
promotions, for the purpose of this study, are defined by temporary reductions in the prices paid 
for products. In order to have their intended effects on consumers, promotions must be advertised 
to consumers through flyers, displays, the internet, or some other medium. It is therefore 
common in both the economic literature and the popular press  for price promotions to be 
included under the umbrella term of “advertising.” This study does not use data on non-price 
advertising, focusing instead on advertised and non-advertised price promotions. 
Researchers have reached a consensus in the literature that promotions are increasingly 
accounting for a greater share of supermarkets’ advertising budgets throughout the United States 
(Zenor, 1994; Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox, 1995 (hereafter BBF); Mela, Gupta, and Lehmann, 1997 (hereafter MGL); and Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta, 1999). Lal, Little, and Villas-Boas (1996) 
found this to also be true in the case of manufacturers and processors in the food retail industry. 
The reasons for this shift are not entirely clear, although researchers have determined that 
advertising and promotions have opposing effects on brand equity and consumer price 
sensitivity. Therefore advertising is more effective in building brand loyalty while promotions 
are more effective in building store traffic and generating store loyalty. 
There is a small stream of literature dedicated specifically to the empirical investigation 
of promotional competition among stores. Leeflang and Wittink (1996) examined the reactions 
of supermarket managers to competitors’ promotions while controlling for consumer response. In 
equilibrium, the authors’ argued, managers seek to maintain steady market shares for brands 
within categories. Therefore when brand-level market shares increase or decrease following 
promotions in the local market and they do not return to previous levels within 10 weeks 
managers have either over- or underreacted to competitors’ promotions. Leeflang and Wittink 
found that competitive reactions, as measured by the length and depth of price promotions, 
increase for brands with greater market share effects across stores and decrease for brands with 
greater effects on market share within stores. Display and feature ads accompanying promotions 
enhance competitive reactions, and managers have a greater tendency to overreact than to 
underreact. Brodie, Bonfrer, and Cutler (1996) conducted a replication of this study and did not 
find strong support for any of the Leeflang and Wittink’s findings, but found even stronger 
evidence that managers tend to over- and underreact to competitors’ price promotions. 
In a study directly related to my own, Steenkamp, et al. (2005) examined the prevalence 
and the nature of supermarket managers’ responses to promotional activity on the part of 
competitors. The authors clearly distinguish between advertising and promotions according to the same criteria that I use. They also classify reactions as being either retaliatory, in that they 
focus on increasing sales for brands or product categories being promoted by competitors, or 
accommodating in that they cede brands or product categories to competitors. The major and 
most relevant findings of the study include: 1) The most common reaction to competitor reaction 
is no response at all. In the case of promotions the authors found no reaction 53.7 percent of the 
time and in the case of advertising there was no reaction 82.5 percent of the time, 2) Promotional 
reactions are far more likely to be retaliatory rather than accommodating, while there is no clear 
difference among the responses to advertising, 3) Short-term reactions are significantly stronger 
than long-term reactions, and 4) Relative to weaker brands, powerful brands within product 
categories result in more aggressive reactions and those reactions are more likely to be 
promotional in nature. 
This study builds upon previous research in two key ways. The first is the breadth of the 
data set used to analyze competitive response. The Leeflang and Wittink study examined a single 
product category and the Steenkamp, et al. study examined approximately 400 product 
categories.  My data set covers virtually the entire supermarket, with approximately 20,000 
products classified into roughly  1,500 product categories and 35  departments. The data set 
includes new and emerging products, niche and organic offerings, and a complete set of national 
brand and private label substitutes.  
The second major extension of this article is the examination of cross-category effects. 
Empirical studies that incorporate a large number of products or product categories are relatively 
scarce in the marketing and economic literature on food retailing. Studies that explicitly 
incorporate cross-category considerations are scarcer still. Exceptions to this include Fader and Lodish (1990) as well as Bell and Lattin (1998), and both studies argue against using one or few 
product categories to draw inferences on all of food retail. 
In this study, I use a sample of 17 metropolitan areas to examine empirically the extent to 
which supermarket chains react to one another’s price cuts and price promotions. In five of the 
cities, the two chains are competing directly with one another while in the remaining 12 only one 
or the other is in operation. Hence the 12 cities without direct competition serve as a convenient 
baseline against which we can compare the incidence of contemporaneous and staggered 
promotional activity in the cities featuring direct competition. The statistical analysis of this 
study takes an important first step into investigating the nature of price and promotional 
competition in the supermarket industry today. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents the data and the 
statistical methods. Section III details the results, section IV provides a discussion including 
suggestions for further research, and section V concludes. 
II. Data and Methodology 
The data used in this study are the price and promotional data for two major US supermarket 
chains that operate primarily in the western United States. Given that both chains, hereafter 
referred to as Chain A and Chain B, offer online retailing and delivery, consumers have access to 
exhaustive price and promotional data. My price and promotional data are drawn directly from 
the chains’ respective corporate websites in 17 major US metropolitan areas. Table 1 displays the 
metropolitan areas sampled as well as the chains operating in each and some relevant summary 
statistics. 
Table 1: The Metropolitan Areas Sampled.  
City  Zip Code  Chain  Population  Median Household Income ($) Boise, ID  83705  A  185,787  42,432 
Palm Springs, CA  92262  A  42,807  43,800 
Salt Lake City, UT  84101  A  178,858  37,287 
Los Angeles, CA  90023  Both  3,849,378  42,667 
Las Vegas, NV  89103  Both  478,434  47,863 
Portland, OR  97213  Both  537,081  42,287 
San Diego, CA  92114  Both  1,256,951  55,637 





















Sacramento, CA  95815  B  453,781  44,867 
San Jose, CA  95113  B  929,936  70,291 
Phoenix, AR  85037  B  1,512,986  42,353 
San Francisco, CA  94102  B  744,041  57,496 
Washington, DC  20001  B  581,531  47,221 
Source: Estimates from the US Census, 2005. 
 
The cities sampled in this study show a great deal of variation in terms of size and 
income levels. A key aspect to my analysis is the effect of population demographics and market 
characteristics on the pricing and promotional strategies of supermarkets. For example, Hoch, et 
al. (1995) estimated the effects of a large number of demographic and competitive factors on 
consumer price sensitivity and found demographics to be far more significant determinants. The 
authors determined that education and house size share inverse relationships with price 
sensitivity and that shoppers with large families as well and blacks and Hispanics are more price 
sensitive. BCP found age and income to significantly decrease price sensitivity and education to 
be largely insignificant. Jones (1997) segmented consumers into “low-income” and “high-
income” groups and calculated price sensitivity to be twice as high for the low-income shoppers.  Mittal (1994) and Kim, Blattberg, and Rossi (1995) argued that in order to optimally set 
prices among categories and brands, retailers need to understand the local distribution of 
consumer price sensitivity. This distribution can be inferred, at least partially, using 
demographics. Only one study, to my knowledge, directly examines the differences in 
demographics among online and conventional grocery shoppers. Degeratu, Rangaswamy, and 
Wu (2000) compared conventional, in-store shoppers to those using the online delivery service 
Peapod. Online shoppers were found to be younger, with smaller families and higher price 
sensitivity. The authors determined that price promotions have less of an impact online because 
shopping online facilitates the direct comparison of products according to several attributes other 
than price, especially nutritional information. These differences between online and brick and 
mortar shopping may manifest themselves in lower prices or shallower promotions in cities with 
the greatest amount of online shopping. 
The price and promotional data cover virtually the entire product offerings of the 
supermarkets for Chains A and B. There are certain exceptions, such as alcohol in the case of 
chain B as well as stationary or large pieces of general merchandise for both chains. The time 
series for Chain A is nine months and the time series for Chain B is one calendar year. The 
current difference in terms of temporal length is due to issues with data collection. In order to 
examine promotional activity exhaustively, the data are organized into 35  supermarket 
departments. Table 2 presents the categories and provides descriptive statistics. 
Table 2: The Promotional Frequency by Department.  
Department  Total Number of 
Products 





  Chain A  Chain B  Chain A  Chain B     
Bakery 
 
52,213  43,993  8.42  8.27  0.15   
Beauty Aids 
 
225,184  382,338  27.91  44.03  16.12***   Baby Care 
 
107,648  199,537  31.37  51.26  19.89***   
Baking and 
Cooking 
181,951  220,051  40.67  29.35  11.32***   
Boxed 
Dinners  
77,809  50,462  48.78  48.28  0.50   
Beer 
 
45,542  N/A  57.20  N/A  N/A   
Beverages  281,109  702,558 
 
66.06  57.08  8.98   
Candy 
 
95,308  163,381  36.48  35.78  0.70   
Cereal and 
Breakfast 
93,164  182,157  45.37  61.53  16.16**   
Canned 
Goods 
147,403  288,005  50.32  38.60  11.62**   
Cleaning 
Products 
112,594  295,521  36.06  45.76  9.70*   
Condiments  186,717 
 
235,055  37.99  34.35  3.64   
Coffee and 
Tea 
121,319  287,944  41.31  38.58  2.73   
Dairy 
 
209,254  507,654  52.02  63.24  11.22*   





73,938  263,090  42.85  56.49  13.64**   
Dairy 
Substitutes 
155  1,354  12.90  33.86  20.96***   
Frozen 
Foods 
383,040  623,388  70.28  84.48  13.68   
General 
Merchandise 
261,339  782,094  27.53  40.68  13.15***   
Health Aids 
 
391,328  948,147  33.57  38.14  4.57   
Kosher 
 
9,360  10,773  23.64  37.34  13.70***   
Mexican 
 
78,606  223,683  34.43  42.88  8.45*   
Meat and 
Seafood 
161,382  638,043  24.06  37.80  13.74***   
Meat 
Substitutes 
141  23,023  0.00  22.42  22.42***   
Organics 
 
41,600  179,727  17.65  49.12  31.47***   Packaged 
Breads 
67,940  275,857  22.53  31.94  9.41***   
Pet Care 
 
100,965  395,701  40.70  46.95  6.25   
Produce and 
Floral 
83,198  534,706  11.21  33.20  21.99***   
Pasta, Rice, 
and Beans 
88,888  483,146  51.23  48.21  3.02   
Soup and 
Chili 
100,978  494,305  43.63  36.39  6.94   
Tobacco 
 
12,767  17,211  0.00  3.21  3.21   
Snacks 
 
370,838  2,422,591  41.16  50.05  8.89   
Spirits 
 
50,445  N/A  71.51  N/A  N/A   
Spices and 
Seasonings 
98,286  741,786  29.40  32.02  2.62   
Wine 
 
146,382  N/A  80.43  N/A  N/A   
Total 
 
4,558,309  12,848,391  42.72  45.72  3.00   
*:Significant at the .10 level. **: At the .05 level. ***: At the .01 level. 
As table 2 shows, there is a wide range of promotional activity across the chains and 
departments. In aggregate, both across time and departments, the percentage of products on 
promotion is statistically the same for both chains. Chain A offered 42.72 percent of its products 
on promotion over a nine month period while Chain B offered 45.72 percent of its products on 
promotion during one year of measurement. Chain B offered a significantly higher share of 
products on promotion than Chain A for several of the largest in-store departments, such as 
produce, meat and seafood, dairy, general merchandise, and breakfast foods. Chain A offered a 
significantly higher promotional share than Chain B for canned goods, baking products, and a 
number of other smaller departments. There is no significant difference in promotional offerings 
between the two chains for several other major departments, including snacks and health aids, 
which are the largest departments by product volume and shelf space. In order to test empirically whether or not these supermarket chains are competing 
through promotions, I use two statistical methods.  First, I seek to determine whether or not 
promotional activity is more intense in absolute terms in the cities in which these terms compete 
with one another both electronically and with brick and mortar stores. In order to achieve this 
goal I test for equality between total promotional activity in the five cities in which these chains 
compete (hereafter known as Competitive Cities) and that in the 13 cities in which only one or 
the other competes (hereafter known as Noncompetitive Cities), across all departments. Second, 
I seek to measure the extent to which the two chains are reacting to one another’s promotions 
and price cuts. In order to do so, I calculate the correlation of promotional activity between 
chains and across time for each of the departments in each of the five competitive cities. 
III. Results 
The first step of the empirical process examines whether or not promotional activity is more 
intense in Competitive Cities, or those in which both chains compete. Promotional activity is 
measured as the average share of products on promotion. In order to compare promotional 
intensity across Competitive and Noncompetitive Cities, I subtract average promotional activity 
in Noncompetitive Cities from that in Competitive Cities and test for a statistical difference from 
zero. The results are compiled in table 3. 
Table 3: Differences in Promotional Activity across Cities, by Department.  












0.007**  0.006  0.005 
Beauty Aids  -0.037***  0.003  -0.041*** 
                                                   
2 The average percentage difference is calculated as the difference between the average number of products on 
promotion in Competitive cities minus the same average, calculated in Noncompetitive Cities. Hence a positive 
number is interpreted as a greater average in Competitive Cities and a negative number implies a greater average in 
Noncompetitive Cities.  
Baby Care 
 
-0.068***  -0.007  -0.055*** 
Baking and 
Cooking 
-0.081***  0.010***  0.011*** 
Boxed 
Dinners  
-0.006  0.021***  0.010* 
Beer 
 
0.068***  N/A  0.068*** 
Beverages 
 
-0.070***  0.008***  0.002 
Candy 
 
-0.073***  -0.008***  -0.025*** 
Cereal and 
Breakfast 
-0.079***  -0.016***  -0.063*** 
Canned 
Goods 
-0.042***  0.012***  0.015*** 
Cleaning 
Products 
-0.041***  -0.008***  -0.035*** 
Condiments 
 
-0.035***  -0.007***  -0.007*** 
Coffee and 
Tea 
-0.093***  0.007**  -0.015*** 
Dairy 
 
-0.069***  0.011***  -0.031*** 
Delicatessen 
 
-0.022***  0.009**  -0.003 
Salad 
Dressing 
-0.016*  0.012***  -0.020*** 
Dairy 
Substitutes 
-0.010  -0.063***  -0.058*** 
Frozen 
Foods 
-0.024***  0.024***  -0.016*** 
General 
Merchandise 
-0.052***  0.013***  -0.030*** 
Health Aids 
 
-0.042***  0.001  -0.025*** 
Kosher 
 
0.065***  -0.011**  -0.007 
Mexican 
 
-0.030***  -0.007***  -0.029*** 
Meat and 
Seafood 
-0.011**  0.001  -0.026*** 
Meat 
Substitutes 
0.000  -0.088***  -0.127*** 
Organics  -0.043***  0.029***  -0.047***  
Packaged 
Breads 
-0.022***  -0.036***  0.005** 
Pet Care 
 
-0.021***  0.022***  -0.008** 
Produce and 
Floral 
-0.004  -0.022***  -0.054*** 
Pasta, Rice, 
and Beans 
-0.026***  0.006**  0.000 
Soup and 
Chili 
-0.032**  -0.014***  -0.008** 
Tobacco 
 
0.000  -0.015*  -0.015** 
Snacks 
 
-0.069***  0.001  -0.034*** 
Spirits 
 
-0.065***  N/A  -0.065*** 
Spices and 
Seasonings 
-0.082***  -0.025***  0.041*** 
Wine 
 
0.121***  N/A  0.121*** 
Total 
 
-0.033***  0.003***  -0.014*** 
*:Significant at the .10 level. **: At the .05 level. ***: At the .01 level. 
Table 3 demonstrates the counterintuitive finding that overall, there is significantly 
greater promotional activity in the Noncompetitive Cities. Standard economic theory posits that 
there would be greater promotional competition in the Competitive Cities,  as the two major 
chains are competing directly. It is important to note, however, that this analysis does not control 
for differences in demographics or the depth of promotional activity. Therefore this finding holds 
true only in the case of promotional frequency but not necessarily for the total monetary value of 
all promotional activity.  
It is clear that this overall difference in promotional activity across cities is driven by 
Chain A. Chain A utilizes a pricing strategy known as everyday low pricing (EDLP), which is 
marked by fewer and shallower price promotions than high-low pricing (HLP), the practice used 
by Chain B. Overall, the stores of Chain A offer 3.3 percent fewer promotions in the Competitive Cities than they do in the Noncompetitive Cities. However B offers a statistically significant 
margin of 0.3 percent more promotions in the Competitive Cities. It is therefore clear that these 
two chains are responding to competitive conditions differently across cities. 
The second component of the empirical analysis goes beyond the examination of absolute 
promotional intensity and examines whether or not the chains are responding to each other’s 
promotional activity. Only the Competitive Cities are relevant in this case, as I am calculating 
the correlation coefficients between promotional activity over time for pairs of stores 
representing Chain A and Chain B for each  of the five Competitive Cities and test for 
coefficients greater than zero in absolute value. The results are summarized in table 4. Positive 
and significant correlation coefficients are interpreted as retaliatory reactions, while negative and 
significant correlation is identified as accommodating reactions. Retaliation is defined as a 
response to a rival’s promotional activity through increased promotions in the short term, while 
accommodation is defined as response through decreased promotions. 
A value of “N/A” denotes that one of the two chains does not carry any products within 
the associated category or that there was no promotional activity for one or both chains. 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients of Promotional Frequency across Chains, by City.  
Department  City and Zip Code 












0.259  0.228  0.183  0.181  0.238 
Beauty Aids 
 
0.130  0.172  0.020  -0.220  -0.379 
Baby Care 
 
-0.149  -0.218  -0.242  -0.287*  -0.040 
Baking and 
Cooking 
0.787***  0.642***  0.789***  0.688***  0.538*** 
Boxed Dinners  
 
0.121  0.101  0.071  -0.273*  -0.165 
Beer 
 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A Beverages 
 
-0.282*  -0.238  -0.264*  0.047  0.042 
Candy 
 
-0.157  0.075  -0.171  -0.391**  -0.531*** 
Cereal and 
Breakfast 
-0.141  -0.344**  -0.347**  0.017  -0.171 
Canned Goods 
 




0.198  0.146  0.087  -0.037  0.132 
Condiments 
 
0.134  0.182  0.068  0.311**  0.409** 
Coffee and Tea 
 
0.265*  0.512***  0.468***  0.499***  0.488*** 
Dairy 
 
0.644***  0.653***  0.657***  -0.301*  0.091 
Delicatessen 
 
-0.109  -0.041  -0.018  -0.231  0.041 
Salad Dressing 
 




N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Frozen Foods 
 
-0.052  -0.125  -0.245  -0.072  -0.062 
General 
Merchandise 
0.062  0.195  0.282*  -0.282*  -0.155 
Health Aids 
 
0.482***  0.557***  0.693***  0.134  0.258 
Kosher 
 
0.860***  0.875***  0.810***  0.389**  0.529*** 
Mexican 
 




0.179  0.256  0.153  0.038  0.044 
Meat Substitutes 
 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Organics 
 
0.211  -0.127  0.039  0.274*  0.584*** 
Packaged Breads 
 
0.271*  -0.059  0.056  0.092  0.041 
Pet Care 
 
0.258*  0.259  0.132  0.103  0.114 
Produce and  0.456***  0.002  0.216  0.030  0.321* Floral 
Pasta, Rice, and 
Beans 
0.560***  0.761***  0.673***  -0.422***  -0.020 
Soup and Chili 
 
0.182  0.252  0.288*  -0.571***  -0.562*** 
Tobacco 
 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Snacks 
 
0.306*  0.386**  0.248  -0.220  0.018 
Spirits 
 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Spices and 
Seasonings 
0.373**  0.258  0.323**  0.449***  -0.030 
Wine 
 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Total 
 
0.676***  0.751***  0.635***  -0.311*  0.051 
*:Significant at the .10 level. **: At the .05 level. ***: At the .01 level. 
  Table 4 displays a wide variety of information on the nature of competition through price 
promotions. In aggregate, across time and departments, the results suggest that Chains A and B 
are responding to one another’s price promotions through retaliations in Las Vegas, Los Angeles, 
and San Diego. However these same two chains are respond to one another accommodatingly in 
Portland and not in any significant fashion in Seattle. These findings are generally in line with 
those of Steenkamp, et al., who found retaliation to be the norm and accommodation to be the 
exception. 
IV. Discussion 
As stated above, this study serves as an important first step in applying empirical methods to the 
examination of the nature of promotional competition between major US supermarket chains. 
The results, as they stand, apply to aggregate data and do not control for important factors such 
as demographics, brand-level market share, or the presence of additional or heterogeneous 
competitors within metropolitan areas.   The results with respect to total promotional activity across cities reveal one very 
surprising figure, namely that across almost all departments and in aggregate there is 
significantly less (more) promotional activity in cities with (without) both chains competing 
directly. It is conceivable that there is, on average, more fierce retail competition overall in the 
Noncompetitive Cities or that the total dollar value of promotions is greater in the Competitive 
Cities, but such insights cannot be drawn from the data at this time. At present, the results 
suggest some form of mild collusion between the two stores, possibly resulting from the 
transparency of prices through the internet, that results in less over promotional activity but not 
necessarily weaker retaliation to one another’s promotions. 
There is also a significant difference in the way the two chains behave in Competitive vs. 
Noncompetitive Cities. Chain A, which is smaller and uses EDLP, promotes significantly fewer 
items in Competitive cities as compared to Noncompetitive cities. Indeed, from the data section 
above, we know that Chain A engages in fewer promotions overall than does Chain B, though 
the difference is not significant. It is entirely possible that the EDLP chain responds to direct 
promotion with the HLP chain by lowering its average prices and decreasing promotional 
activity, thus more closely adopting the full EDLP strategy. Chain B engages in slightly more 
promotions in Competitive Cities, though the difference is significant. The intuition behind this 
finding may be similar to that of the EDLP chain, namely that Chain B responds to direct 
competition with Chain A by raising its overall prices slightly but offering more and deeper 
promotions. 
The findings in table 4 are much more in line with previous research on the nature of 
promotional competition, although the examination in terms of such a wide variety of 
departments is an addition to the literature. There are striking differences in the nature of promotional activity both across cities and across departments. The two chains compete very 
fiercely in terms of promotional activity in Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and San Diego. Those three 
constitute the largest three markets, by far, of the five Competitive Cities, and so this may well 
represent a longstanding competition for highly lucrative foot traffic. Seattle demonstrates no 
promotional competition at all between the two chains, which is most likely explained by the 
presence of additional competition such as Wal-Mart Supercenters. 
Portland, OR, demonstrates the interesting phenomenon of negative and significant 
correlation in promotional activity between the two chains. This represents accommodating 
responses to one another in promotions, in that they are responding to promotional activity on the 
part of rivals with downturns in promotions. Hence in Portland the two chains are most likely 
operating promotional calendars that are sufficiently staggered so as to not draw customers away 
from one another, but rather to enhance the loyalty of existing customers. 
Among departments, baking and cooking, canned goods, coffee and tea, dairy, health 
aids, pasta, and spices and seasonings all show significant and usually retaliatory promotional 
competition. These are all large and varied departments, which largely discounts the potential 
explanation of simultaneous or closely staggered price promotions resulting from manufacturers’ 
trade promotions. I also find highly significant and positive correlations among cities for the 
kosher department, but the relatively small size of that department suggests that trade promotions 
could be highly influential in driving this result.  
For several other large and financially important departments, such as meat and seafood, 
produce, frozen foods, and general merchandise, there is little to no evidence of promotional 
interaction between the two chains. The rational for supermarkets in choosing to compete in some major departments and not others is a highly interesting and important question that will be 
explored further in forthcoming versions of this paper. 
V. Conclusions 
This study begins the process of answering a number of very important, longstanding questions 
in food retail in the United States. The study produces two major studies, one of which goes 
against expectations and other conforms to expectations. In the former case, I find that 
promotional activity between two competing chains is significantly decreased in the cities in 
which they compete directly, as compared to cities with only one of the two chains. In the latter 
case, I find that most promotional interaction between chains tends to be retaliatory, though there 
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